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WHY SUPERVISE THE CONVENTION?
James C. Hathaway*
he Refugee Convention is the only major
human rights treaty that is not externally
supervised. Under all of the other key UN
human rights accords — on the rights of women
and children, against torture and racial discrimi-
nation, and to promote civil and political, as well
as economic, social, and cultural rights — there
is at least some effort made to ensure that States
are held accountable for what they have signed
onto.
All of these treaties require governments to file
periodic reports setting out their cases for having
complied with international law and to submit
to a face-to-face review of their assertions. These
reviews are conducted by independent experts,
usually armed with strong NGO background
information and sometimes assisted by direct
NGO interventions. Beyond periodic reporting,
UN human rights treaties may allow one State
Party to file a formal complaint against another
State Party for breach of the treaty (though no
government has ever elected to do so); and some
permit individuals whose rights have been
breached and who have not been able to remedy
their situation domestically to file complaints
directly with a UN human rights supervisory
body.
Under the Refugee Convention, in contrast, no
external body has been set up to receive and
comment on periodic reports, much less to adju-
dicate inter-State or individuated complaints.
Instead, under Article 35 of the Convention, State
Editor’s Note: This Issue of the Month on a new supervisory mechanism for the 1951 Convention brings together
five contributions on various aspects to be taken into consideration for such a mechanism. The first examines why
supervision of the Refugee Convention is necessary. The second summarises possible options for supervising the
Convention. The third raises questions of accountability, with the fourth taking that argument further. The final
piece provides a suggested mechanism that could readily be implemented by UNHCR to improve supervision of
the Convention. It is hoped that many of these views will feed into the 11 December pre-Ministerial meeting, as
well as the Ministerial meeting commemorating the 50th anniversary of the Convention on 12 and 13 December
2001, in Geneva, Switzerland.
Parties agree to cooperate with UNHCR’s efforts
to ensure that the Refugee Convention is respected
by, for example, reporting to UNHCR on legisla-
tive and practical steps taken to ensure refugee
rights.
UNHCR protection officers in the field do
provide confidential reports to headquarters staff,
but States are not required to submit to public,
or even collegial, scrutiny of their records. As a
result, there is no forum within which to require
governments to engage in the kind of dialogue of
justification that
is a standard
feature of the
other human
rights systems.
Nor has there
been any effort
by UNHCR,
formally, to in-
volve refugees or their advocates in the
supervision of refugee rights. The tenor of
Article 35 aside, supervision of refugee rights by
UNHCR remains very much a matter of private
representations to States.
UNHCR’s public supervisory role has instead
focused on the issuance by its Executive Com-
mittee (EXCOM) of Conclusions on International
Protection of Refugees. While not formally
binding, the moral force of these consensus
see next page
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recommendations adopted by representatives of
major governments has often influenced the
conduct of States. The EXCOM has, however,
become increasingly reluctant to grapple with
critical contemporary protection issues, recently
refusing even to affirm the legal significance of its
own work. There
is, therefore, some
doubt about the
continuing viabil-
ity of even this
minimally intru-
sive approach to
the external
supervision of
refugee rights.
To respond to this
void, UNHCR commissioned a study of the possi-
bility of enhanced supervision of refugee law,
submitted last July by highly regarded expert Walter
Kälin (available on UNHCR’s website:
www.unhcr.ch). Kälin rejects a periodic reporting
system for the Refugee Convention on the grounds
that such mechanisms impose too high a burden on
States, are plagued by delays, and result in supervi-
sion of questionable quality. He also recommends
against allowing individual complaints to an expert
body, arguing that a disproportionate share of such
complaints would originate in the developed world,
and that the volume of applications would soon over-
whelm any expert body.
Instead, Kälin opts for a three-part approach to
supervision of the Refugee Convention. First,
selective country-specific protection reviews of State
Party compliance would be conducted by EXCOM-
approved experts.  They would review a government-
prepared memo and (with consent) conduct an
on-site visit and consultations in the country
concerned, leading to a discussion within an
EXCOM sub-committee and a public report.
Second, an effort should be made to gain support
for the establishment of an international judicial
body with power to issue advisory opinions on
refugee law at the request of States, domestic courts,
or UNHCR.  Third, the EXCOM would be asked
to appoint expert rapporteurs to review specific
concerns across States (whether parties to the
Convention or not) — for example on the protec-
tion of refugee women and children or on access to
asylum. The rapporteurs would report to EXCOM,
hopefully generating public discussion and possible
recommendations. (For more detail on Kälin’s
paper, see “Some Options for Supervising the 1951
Convention” in this issue of Talk Back.)
There is no doubt that both the decision to open a
debate on a supervisory mechanism and the specif-
ics of the Kälin proposal mark a significant advance
on the status quo, but important questions remain
to be addressed. The time is right for refugees and
their advocates to consider, for example:
• Does the EXCOM-based structure proposed
meet Kälin’s own insistence that the mechanism
be not only feasible, but also independent,
objective, transparent, and open to the voices of
all?
• Is there really no value in considering ways by
which to revitalise periodic reporting and/or the
use of individuated complaints to advance the
protection of refugee rights?
• Can the same mechanism proposed meaningfully
oversee not only respect for refugee rights, but
also the (highly legalised) interpretation of the
refugee definition?
• And perhaps most fundamentally, is it appropri-
ate for the supervisory mechanism to be directed
only to oversight of State actions, or should those
of inter-governmental and non-governmental
entities involved in refugee protection be scruti-
nised as well? ♦
*  James C. Hathaway is Professor of Law and Direc-
tor of the Program in Refugee and Asylum Law, Uni-
versity of Michigan.
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